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THE REVISION OF A CREED.

We have at present the strange spectacle that in one of our churches the proposition is discussed to change some grave particulars of creed. The old doctrines have become "unpreachable," as it is expressed, either because the ministers no longer believe them, or because people are loath to listen to ideas which now appear as monstrosities and absurdities.

We naturally hail the progress of a church and its development into broader views of religious truth. Yet at the same time we feel the littleness of the advance. What is the progress of a few steps, if a man has to travel hundreds of miles! Moreover, what is any progress, if it is done under the pressure of circumstances only and not from a desire to advance and keep abreast with the true spirit of the times! The change of a creed should not be forced upon a church from without by the progress of unchurched thinkers, but it should result from the growth and expanse of its own life. The church, as the moral instructor of mankind, should not be dragged along behind the triumphant march of humanity, but should deploy in front with the vanguard of science!

The eternal damnation of noble-minded heathen and of the tender-souled infants who happen to die unbaptized, was sternly believed in by the ancestors of our Presbyterian friends. They declared, without giving any reasonable argument for their opinion, that this is part of the divine order of things, and whosoever does not believe it, will be damned for all eternity, together with the wise Socrates and the virtuous Confucius.

Who made Calvin the councillor of divine providence and who gave him the right of electing or rejecting the souls of men? On what ground could his narrow view, excusable in his time, be incorporated into the creed of a church? The argument on which Calvin's view rests, was very weak, but the founders of the Presbyterian Church being convinced of its truth, thought to strengthen it by incorporating the doctrine into their Confession. An idea, once sanctified by tradition, has a tenacious life. Reverence for the founders of a church will keep their errors sacred and will not allow an impartial investigation of their opinions.

Reverence is a good thing; but all reverence toward men, be they ever so venerable, must be controlled by the reverence for truth. And this is the worst part of the change of the Confession. The change, it appears, is not made because the objectionable doctrines are recognized as errors; but simply because they are at the present time too repulsive for popular acceptance.

Why are the doctrines of eternal punishment not openly and confessedly branded as errors? Why can it not be acknowledged that tenets which our fathers considered as truths of divine revelation, were after all their personal and private opinions only?

We ask why, but receive no explanation. Yet there is a reason that lurks behind; although it seems as if the men who are most concerned were not conscious of it. If the error were acknowledged, a principle would be pronounced which opens the door to a greater and more comprehensive reform. And such a reform is not wanted. The clergy seem to be afraid of it. If the error is conceded, it means the denial of the infallibility of the Confession. The dogmas of the church cease to be absolute verities; and truth is recognized above the creed of the church, as the highest court of appeal—truth, *ascertainable by philosophical enquiry and scientific research.*

This would be equivalent to the abolition of all dogmas and would mean the enthronement of a principle to fill their place. This principle, if we look at it closely, is nothing new; it is an old acquaintance of ours; it is the same principle on which science stands. And the recognition of this principle would be the conciliation between science and religion once for all.

Brethren, do not shut your eyes in broad daylight, but look freely about and follow the example of the great founder of Christianity. Worship God not in vain repetitions, not in pagan adoration, as if God were a man like ourselves. Worship God in spirit and in truth. Acknowledge the superiority of truth above your creed, and be not ashamed of widening the pale of your churches.

If you acknowledge the supremacy of truth and make your changes in the Confession because truth compels you to make them, your progress will be that of a man who walketh upright and straight. But if you do not acknowledge the superiority of truth above your creed, if you identify truth with your creed, your

progress will be the advance of a soldier loitering in the rear of his army, who is afraid of being left behind. You will unwillingly have to yield to the necessity of a change; and you will have to do it again and again, and always without dignity.

Is it dignified to alter a religious creed because it appears as a relic of barbarism, because it has become odious to the people, and because it no longer suits their tastes? Your Confession should be allegiance to truth. Will you degrade it to be the unstable expression of the average opinion of your members?

There is but one way to free yourselves from all these difficulties. Recognize no dogma as absolute and reverence no confession as infallible; but let truth, ascertainable truth, be the supreme judge of all doctrines and of all traditions.

Your bible, your hymn-book, your catechism, the history of your church, and the reminiscences of your venerable leaders shall remain respected among yourself and children, but let them not be overrated in their authority. Truth reigns above them all, and the holiness of truth is the foundation of all true religion.

When Luther stood before the emperor and the representatives of church and state, he begged to be refuted, and if he were refuted, he promised to keep silence; but as he was not, he continued to preach and he preached boldly in the name of truth as one that had authority. Therefore let religious progress be made as in the era of the Reformation, not in complaisance to popular opinion, but squarely in the name of truth.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OXFORD MOVEMENT.

BY WILLIAM R. THAYER.

II.

[CONCLUDED.]

THUS did Newman pronounce Arnoldism to be untenable, and a *Via Media* to be impossible: Scepticism and Roman Catholicism are, he finally concluded, the inexorable alternatives. The steps of his conversion were marked by the publication of a series of *Tracts for the Times*—whence the name Tractarian—mere broadsides at first, but subsequently extended to religious treatises, in which he and his friends registered the course of their investigations in theological history, explained the points at issue, and upheld a higher ideal of holiness and sincerity in the Church and of personal righteousness among its members. Those *Tracts* made a deep impression, and well they might; for they were written with great earnestness and, unlike most theological literature, they combined acute criticism and exposition of hard and abstruse dogmas with a vivifying spirituality. Furthermore, those which Newman contributed had those literary qualities,—terseness, variety, and grace,—which have made him one of the masters of English prose style; charms too rarely met in theological literature. Above all, his personality, not less than his intellectual endowments, drew to him disciples of very different temperaments, and made his presence, for more than ten years, a spiritualizing influence at Oxford.

One of these disciples was William George Ward, ten years younger than Newman. His father was a Tory member of Parliament, but even better known as the best cricketer of his generation. Ward had a remarkable, yet very odd, mind. He was passionately fond of music, yet cared nothing for painting, or the other fine arts; he excelled in mathematics and logic, yet had no liking for history, and no aptitude for criticism. Underlying all, was a deep religious nature. If a subject did not interest him, he simply ignored it, and never pretended to even a superficial knowledge of it. At the University he was recognized as a man of unusual but eccentric parts, an inveterate debater whose skill in dialectics caused him to be compared with Socrates. He was elected to a fellowship and taught mathematics at Balliol College. His religious leaning was at first towards Arnoldism: but the inconsistencies of its principles, its evident tendency towards scepticism, and, more potent than all, an inborn craving for a fixed and unvarying creed and for forms of worship, which should stimulate and support his devoutness, led him away from Arnold. His habitual attitude was that of a man who depends upon a leader: and that leader he soon found in Newman, the holiness of whose life and the brilliance of whose intellect satisfied Ward's spiritual and intellectual needs. Ward, logician though he was, nevertheless lacked the primal requisite of a logician—unflagging zeal in searching evidence back to its fountain-head: so he never established at first-hand the conclusions he accepted in the controversy between the Anglican and the Roman Church. He deemed the historical evidence unimportant, although upon that, and that only, can rational conclusions be based; but, accepting the opinions which Newman deduced from his personal review of the origin and development of Christian dogmas, he used them very effectively in his discussions. In a less ingenuous man this might have seemed inconsistent, but he was always perfectly frank in stating from whom he took his principles, and he would have agreed that it is as unnecessary for a controversialist to collect all his material for himself, as for a fencer to go down in a mine and dig out the iron for his sword. Ward, both by the temper of his mind and by the lighter responsibility of his position, was more rapid than Newman in his advances towards Romanism. Newman was long sincerely bent on finding the Middle Road; his associations with the Anglican Church were strong: Ward,

on the contrary foresaw that a compromise was impossible, and he had from early manhood felt an aversion for the Reformation, which had suppressed many of the means towards and symbols of a pious life. Newman, seeing numerous followers dependent on his guiding, was bound to proceed no faster than his conscience and reason would justify; but Ward was under obligations to himself only.

By the year 1838 there were symptoms of an approaching crisis in the Movement. Newman had already acquiesced in some doctrines which some of his colleagues and disciples could not accept; and churchmen outside of the Movement already declared that he was hastening towards Rome. The Tractarians, in general, revived ritualistic ceremonial and adopted in their daily lives many of the ascetic habits which were popularly associated with mediæval Romanism, practises which, to souls imbued with mysticism and devoutness, aided the spiritual growth, but which, seen by the average practical—not to say Philistine—Englishman, appeared superstitious and idle, and were associated with popish degeneracy. And as their forms of worship took on a close resemblance to those which, three centuries before, had been banished from the Church of England, the Newmanites made more vigorous assaults on Anglican doctrines, until early in 1841, Newman published *Tract No. 90*, in which he examined the thirty-nine articles of Anglican belief, and showed how inconsistent they were one with another, and how they represented a chaotic mixture of Romanism and Protestantism, and could not be expected to satisfy either. The authorities of Oxford were aroused. Newman's opponents accused him of "shifty" and "ambiguous" expressions, of "hateful verbal sophistry and mental reservation," of Jesuitical subtlety, of having covertly worked in behalf of Romanism, while he held a position in the Established Church. Newman, without retracting his opinions, agreed to discontinue the publication of the *Tracts*, and soon retired from active leadership. When the bishops condemned *Tract No. 90* he wrote that "if the view (advocated by the *Tract*) were silenced he could not remain in the Church," and he thought of issuing a protest to show that he had not been silenced, but this project he abandoned "in despair." Soon afterwards, in translating St. Athanasius he discerned what he believed to be an "ominous condemnation of the Anglican position." "The pure Arians," he writes in his *Apologia*, "were the Protestants, the semi-Arians were the Anglicans, and Rome now was where it was then."

It was at this juncture that Ward became conspicuous. He uttered without reserve, opinions which Newman had expressed more cautiously: he showed that the *Book of Common Prayer*—to which Anglicans pointed in justification of their faith—was excellent because in reality it was compiled from the Roman breviary; whereas the thirty-nine articles had been framed for the obvious purpose of pleasing Protestants and of coaxing Catholics to accept them. He stigmatized Cranmer and his fellows in the Reformation, as rebels and perjurors—rebels from their obedience to their spiritual superior, perjurors in that having taken oath to abide by and maintain the Catholic doctrines they actively supported a heresy, which had its ignominious origin in the desire of a profligate king to be divorced from his lawful wife. Those articles, Ward insisted, could be subscribed by candid men only in a "non-natural sense," and he maintained further that they are so elastic as to justify anyone in adopting even the interpretation which Romanists attach to them. So complete, however, was his deference to Newman, that he avowed his willingness to retract any of his conclusions which Newman should declare to be unwarranted. In the two following years it became evident to Ward that the reformation of the Anglican church in the direction he desired was not to be. Even so late as 1842 both he and Newman appear to have hoped that Anglicans, having abolished one by one the heresies in creed and practice which had corrupted their church since the time of Henry VIII, would peacefully and almost insensibly return to the fold of the Catholic church from which they had wandered: the reunion would neither shock nor surprise them; on the contrary, they would be surprised to see how near they had been to the gate of the fold during three centuries. But now this consummation was despaired of: instead of the natural and easy remerging into Romanism, two courses lay before the extreme Tractarians: either immediately to renounce Anglicanism and join the Catholic church—thereby confessing that the chasm between the two was unbridgeable; or to put to a final test the question whether the Thirty-nine Articles could be so interpreted as to permit a person who subscribed them to hold views and to use forms popularly condemned as Romish. Sibthorp, one of the weaker followers of Newman, took the first course, his conversion causing dismay among the Anglicans, who looked upon it as the first stone of an avalanche towards Rome: Ward, by the publication in 1844 of a book entitled *The Ideal of a Christian Church considered in comparison with existing practice*, sought to bring the conflicting and ambiguous canons of Anglicanism to a trial.

This work ranks next to Newman's tracts as the most important literary product of the Oxford movement. In it Ward states very fully those views to which I have briefly referred. He asserts that there is no middle ground between dogmatic religion and scepticism. Our reason, he shows, can never attain

to a knowledge of God, and cannot therefore be the foundation or the criterion of belief: nor, on the other hand, can mere faith be depended upon, because it springs from the emotions, which are subjective, fickle, inconsecutive. But if both reason and faith are untrustworthy, what guide remains to conduct us to religious verity? An infallible guide, Ward replies, our conscience. Let a man follow that, which is the moral nature, the divine inspiration, and it will lead him to a knowledge of God, and to a holy life. Let him use those spiritual aids which lie nearest to him, testing each by conscience, and he will advance into the Catholic life, which alone has all the means, all the forms, all the symbols and practises, suited to the development and sustenance of the whole religious nature. You cannot judge the merits or defects of a moral scheme from the outside: adopt it, order your life by it, if you would discover its virtues. Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity are the "notes" of moral truth; they are to be found complete only in the Catholic Church; other communions may have a fraction, she possesses them all by divine favor.

Such are the main arguments of Ward's *Ideal*—supplemented by criticisms of Anglicanism, and by application of his principles to the current needs of society.

In a few weeks after the publication of the *Ideal* not only conservative Oxford but all the strongholds of Anglicanism were in a ferment. The Vice-Chancellor of the University summoned Ward before him, and, confronting him with "six of the most startling and extreme passages of the *Ideal*," asked him if he wished to disavow them. Ward declined to make any statements until he should be informed what action the heads of the University proposed to take. This soon appeared in a notice, published by the Vice-Chancellor, summoning a convocation for the 13th of February, 1845, at which a resolution should be voted upon, declaring that the passages in the *Ideal* were inconsistent with the Thirty-nine Articles to which Ward had subscribed before being admitted to the degrees of B. A. and M. A. Ward rejoiced at this determination, because he felt that the ambiguities of Anglicanism would at last be cleared up: the Convocation could not condemn his interpretation of the articles until it should formally and officially proclaim what it held to be the orthodox interpretation. But it was soon evident that to carry out the proposal would shake the Established Church from top to bottom. If the Low Church test were adopted—and the Low Church party seemed to predominate in the University—members of the High Church would be placed in as difficult a position as Ward himself. All factions awoke to the bewildering fact, that they belonged to a Church whose canons were so loose that no construction could be put upon them which would not brand with heresy a considerable number of its members. And while all were unanimous in agreeing that Ward's Romish tendencies could not be tolerated, yet they acquitted him of the imputation of bad faith, and conjured the University heads to withdraw the test. Tait (subsequently Archbishop of Canterbury), Dean Stanley wrote nearly forty years later, "issued a powerful and convincing protest against the danger of enforcing this new test on the whole Church of England. Mr. Maurice, forgiving all the obloquy with which he had been loaded by the High Church party, came forward at the same time. Professor Donkin, the most serene, unimpassioned intellect of Oxford, wrote a short and trenchant pamphlet on the subject. Mr. Hull, the venerable opponent of the Athanasian creed, became the champion of the party now placed in so much danger of being themselves the victims of a popular clamor. Milman, from his retreat in the cloisters of Westminster, loudly protested against the impolicy of the whole proceeding." "Probably, after all," wrote Maurice to a friend, "Ward signs the documents about as honestly as the rest of the world." Gladstone, who had published in the *Quarterly Review* a criticism hostile to the conclusions of the *Ideal*, now wrote: "Yet more do I feel the false position in which the University and the Church will be placed if in these judicial proceedings it be found, that men may tamper with the Articles in relation to the Holy Trinity and the Offices of our Lord and retain their degrees, while a man who sins on the particular points of issue between Rome and the Church of England is to be deprived of his, at the instance of a Board of which that very man is a member." The University withdrew the test, and thereby the Church of England showed her unwillingness or inability squarely to define her position. Ward, by her retreat, could claim a victory: for did it not imply that she tacitly admitted the inconsistencies and conflicts in her Thirty-nine Articles to be irreconcilable, and incapable of a simple, uniform, and straightforward interpretation?

So when the Convocation met in the Sheldonian Theatre at Oxford, on February 13, the proceedings were limited to giving Ward a chance to retract the six obnoxious passages quoted from the *Ideal*, and to depriving him of his University degree, if he refused. In accordance with the pedantic traditions of Oxford the proceedings were carried on in Latin, but Ward was allowed to conduct his defense in English, and this he did with remarkable energy and candor, restating his objections to the indefiniteness of the Thirty-nine Articles, and declaring that if it was the intention of the Church of England that they necessarily be subscribed in their natural sense, there should be no subscribers to them at all. "They would never

have let Ward speak in English if they had known how well he could speak," Stanley remarked to Jowett: but the result was a foregone conclusion, and could not be altered by eloquence or logic. The vote of censure on the passages from the *Ideal* was carried by 777 to 391; that of degradation by 569 to 511. An attempt was then made to pass a vote of condemnation on Newman's *Tract No. 90*, but the assembly grew uproarious, and adjourned.

With this dramatic episode the Oxford movement collapsed: or rather let us say that the antagonistic elements which for nearly fifteen years had been held in suspense were now precipitated. Ward and his friend Oakeley formally joined the Church of Rome, Newman soon followed; Pusey and his company did not go over, but remained on the Romeward frontier of Anglicanism; the majority of the younger men who continued to hold places in the University or in the Established Church, abode by Broad Church principles; and, finally, a considerable number of those who at one time or another had felt Newman's spell, passed out of Anglicanism altogether, and were counted among the Rationalists.

The fruits of the Movement cannot be easily reckoned; yet some of them can be specified. Taken as a whole the Oxford Movement represents the chief spiritualizing energy within the English Church during this century; and though the points on which it finally split were inevitably points of doctrine, yet its religious inspiration exercised a lifelong influence upon all, no matter which path they took after the division. It added few members to the Romish Church in England, yet they were men who for intellectual ability and piety commanded a deeper respect than had been felt by Englishmen for English Romanists during more than three centuries. It brought out anew the anomalies inherent in Anglicanism, which Milton, to mention but a single critic of the Established Church, yet the greatest,—had held up to the light. It emphasized the fact, which every sincere believer in religion cannot afford to ignore, that there is no logical middle ground between Faith and Agnosticism—that to allow individual interpretations to be put on Scripture, destroys that unity of doctrine which is the chief sign of orthodoxy. It forced every Anglican to ask himself: "What do I believe? and why?"—questions most pertinent at a time when men accepted the Established Church because their fathers had accepted it, and when they repeated its formularies without inquiring into them.

The course of the Established Church during the past half century has been mainly in the direction opposite to that in which the Tractarians would have led it, whence we might superficially conclude that their influence was brief and narrow; more extreme ritualism has, to be sure, obtained among some of its members, but the majority have tended towards a larger liberalism: Maurice, Robertson, Kingsley, Stanley, Church, Tait, Jowett, and Gladstone represent the phases of that liberalism. Their work, whether ecclesiastic or lay, has been more practical, and less dogmatic; their church has been purified of many of her abuses; she has been turned more closely than ever before to the daily needs of men, and, although she is still the rich man's church, she no longer despises the poor. This purification and tolerance and practicalness are no doubt in some measure a reflection of the spiritualizing influence of the Oxford Movement; in even larger measure they are the expression of that great ethical inspiration which, as has been already remarked, has quickened all sects.

Three centuries and a half ago when the Church of England separated from the Church of Rome, each, as it gained the ascendant, persecuted the other: Anglicans were burnt in the bonfires kindled at Smithfield and Oxford; Romanists were imprisoned in the Tower, or banished beyond the sea. In our century a similar splitting up has taken place, but without bonfires and persecutions, and even without the loss of mutual respect on the part of those who, standing together at the outset, traveled far asunder. Tait and Stanley, Jowett and Church, have only admiration to express for the character of Ward; Matthew Arnold never speaks of Newman but with reverence and gratitude. In this respect, and in many others, the Oxford Movement, which I have described briefly, not attempting to interpose opinions of my own, because it is better that every one should judge for himself,—is among the most interesting and significant of modern times. Nor can a review of it be closed more fittingly than by quoting these stanzas of Clough—himself one of the noblest of the men connected with it, and the spokesman of the religious longings of many earnest souls of the present day.

"As ships becalmed at eve, that lay
With canvas drooping, side by side
Two towers of sail, at dawn of day
Are scarce long leagues apart descried:

"When fell the night, up sprung the breeze
And all the darkling hours they plied,
Nor dreamt but each the self-same seas
By each was cleaving side by side.

. . . . . .

"One port, methought, alike they sought
One purpose hold where'er they fare
O bounding breeze, O rushing seas,
At last, at last unite them there."

CAMBRIDGE, Mass., 1889.

SHALL COLORED CITIZENS BE BANISHED?

BY FREDERICK MAY HOLLAND.

THE OPEN COURT for January 23, contains a demand for "the return of the African to Africa," by Professor Cope, who holds "that the adoption of this

course is essential to our self preservation, and that it cannot be carried into effect at too early a day."

Now, in the first place, it must be remembered that our colored people have always hated this plan; and that it was largely in consequence of their protests, sixty years ago, that the Colonization Society proved a failure. Even then they preferred slavery to Africa; and they have much more reason to object to Africa now. The indignation which they showed against Andrew Johnson's threat to banish them would break out once more, if there were serious danger of their being forced away without their own consent; and it is certain that this consent would be generally refused. The most intelligent and influential among them hold positions for which they could find no equivalents in Africa; there are many others who depend for support upon white employers and customers; and local attachment is strong throughout the race. Their unwillingness to leave is increased by the fact that the proposal to remove them involves a denial, not only of their value as citizens but of their right to citizenship. This was their main objection in 1830; and it is sure to be felt by all of them at present. There might not be any general resistance to removal by force, for they are a very peaceable people; but there would be so much sorrow and suffering as would make this the saddest scene in modern history. The woes of Evangeline and her people would be of no importance in comparison. A closer parallel might be found in the expulsion of the Jews and Moors from Spain; and the main difference is that our victims would be much more numerous.

Fortunately, however, the Constitution of the United States makes it as completely impossible to banish citizens on account of complexion as on account of religious views; and even if the colored people were willing to depart as a body, the expense would be so great as to make the plan impracticable. Moreover, the South cannot afford to lose so many laborers; and the Republican party would be badly off without the colored voters. If they had not supported Hayes and Harrison, neither would have been elected.

We are not going to send those eight millions of industrious and loyal citizens out of the country, even if they are willing to go. We must make the best of their being here; and the less that is said about sending them away, the better will be their treatment, as well as their behavior, both South and North. Common humanity requires that we treat them as if we are willing to have them remain among us. If we do not feel so, we cannot behave kindly and honestly.

The condition of the colored people is rapidly improving, even in the South; but, even in the North, there is still so much prejudice against them as to make it very important to answer what Professor Cope says against their value. In his opinion, "The greatest danger which flows from the presence of the negro in this country, is the certainty of the contamination of the race." This is the old argument which used to be brought up against emancipating the slaves, "Do you want your daughter to marry a nigger?" The abolitionists took that risk; and it has not proved serious. A recent book by a Southern clergyman, Haygood's Pleas for Progress, shows from careful investigation, that the cases in which children are born from parents of different races, are now much more rare than before the war. Amalgamation was the child of slavery, and is fast following its parent into oblivion. Colored women are now able to protect themselves; and the feeling against mixed marriages is strong enough in both races to prevent any alarming frequency.

The Professor is also alarmed at the danger from the disfranchisement of the freedmen to "our political harmony and perhaps even our national integrity." "The first rumble of the approaching storm," he says, "is to be found in President Harrison's message, where he proposes that the polls in the South shall no longer be under state but under federal control." Judging from the utterances of Republican members of Congress from the South, as well as leading Northern newspapers, I should say, that there was nothing worse in the message than heat-lightning. At all events, to banish the freedman, because he is disfranchised, is too much like the old custom of forbidding an anti-slavery meeting, because there was likely to be a mob against it. There will, I hope, come a time, when colored men shall vote in every state of the Union, with as little hindrance as in Tennessee or Virginia, and with as little injury either to "political harmony" or to local interests. No sensible colored man wishes to revive the rule of the carpet-baggers; and the present desire of the South, to give an equally good education to all her children, must ultimately force her to acknowledge fully the educational value of the ballot-box. The one thing which is most certain, however, is that we must not send the negro away because we cannot do him full justice.

And justice demands vigorous protest against such statements as "The negro remains undeveloped mentally." . . . . "He has had as much time in the past as any other race, and he has not improved it." Now, even in Africa, we find that the Mandingoes, ancestors of many of our slaves, have taught themselves to build walled towns, work in iron and gold, weave cotton cloth, and cultivate a considerable variety of crops. The Ashantees, too, and many other negro tribes have risen far above the primitive condition of man. What is more to the purpose, is that the negro has shown a singular capacity for learning from other races. He flourishes in such close contact with civ-

ilization as kills Indians, Australians, and other savages. There is nothing which we can teach, not even astronomy or sculpture, or authorship, which he has not readily learned. There was once great difference of opinion about the meaning of our national constitution. Most of our statesmen held that it sanctioned slavery; and the white abolitionists, very generally, held that they ought to refuse to vote. Mr. Garrison even carried his dislike of the constitution so far as to burn it publicly; and both he and Wendell Phillips were constantly opposing desire to preserve the Union as hostile to Abolitionism. Now it is a curious fact that the free colored people, while almost worshiping Garrison and Phillips, very generally refused to follow them into dis-unionism. They insisted on voting, and they kept hoping for a time when slavery would be abolished constitutionally. We all know that this proved to be the case. It was the desire of the North to preserve the Union which finally led to emancipation. There were very few white men, before the war, who saw the real meaning of the constitution, or the actual tendency of the times as clearly as colored men like Douglass and Ward. The latter was a full-blooded negro, so black that "when he shut his eyes, you could not see where he stood." It was his arguments which converted Douglass from Garrisonianism. He was also able, by the might of his presence and eloquence, to quell a mob of rioters who were trying to break up an anti-slavery meeting, under the pretense that negroes were no better than monkeys. Ward was a good proof of the fact that his race has developed mentally, especially as he had been the pastor of a white congregation. I might cite dozens of such instances.

But let me, in conclusion, say that the heroism shown by our colored soldiers, in spite of much injustice from the government, proves that there is no part of our population whose presence could less safely be spared. If we ever have a war with any foreign nation, we must rely mainly on colored regiments for garrisoning the southern coasts; and we shall not rely in vain. The record of the race, not only as soldiers but as laborers, is so good, that our anxiety should be, not how we can get rid of them, but how we can make them appreciated.

CONCORD, Mass., January 29, 1890.

A DRAGON HUNT IN THE RIVIERA.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

I.

IN the fictitious world, created by superstition over the real world, there are characteristic fauna and flora, and traceable evolutions of genera and species. These creatures, originally imaginary, have been given actuality by embodiment in institutions. The world becomes to us really what we believe it to be. Some of the forms created by superstition have been tamed and turned to the service of civilization; some are reduced to domestic pets, and only occasionally bite or scratch us, like our cats and dogs; others still run wild, and in remote regions are dangerous; and some species are fossilized. But there are species of which, though generally extinct, specimens survive here and there in artificial habitats.

Of this class is the Dragon. There are two or three churches in Christendom erected in honor of dragon-slayers, where it is a necessity of faith to believe in the actuality of the vanquished monster. Some years ago, being invited to give a course of lectures at the Royal Institution, London, on Demonology, I began my preparations in Rome, and, having to deal with Dragons, visited the ancient church of Saint George. The sacristan showed me the banner borne by the saint in his encounter with the dragon, and the spear thrust down the monster's jaws; but when I asked to see a bit of the dragon the priest eyed me suspiciously, as if I were jesting,—though I was never more serious,—closed up the relics, and vanished. I recalled an incident related by Dumas in his "Voyage en Suisse." He went to some church where a hair of the Virgin Mary is preserved, but, on gazing in the glass case, said, "I cannot see it." The sacristan shrugged his shoulders and remarked, "I have been showing it twenty years but have never seen it yet." There are things that can only be seen by the eye of strong faith, and the dragon, at Rome, seemed to be of this category.

But I renewed my quest in France. That was the great field of dragons and dragon-slayers. In a delightful little volume of "Essays" by Miss Dempster, an English lady residing at Cannes, there is a chapter in which the dragon-slayers of France are enumerated. There was St. Martin on the Garonne, 4th century; St. Julien, 1st; St. Pol, 6th; St. Radigonde, at Poitiers, 6th; St. Bertian, Comminge, 6th; St. Romanus, Rouen, 7th; St. Amand, on the Scarpe, 7th; St. Arnel, Isle of Vilaine (?); St. Florent, Saumur, 3d. St. Gilles slew a dragon somewhere; St. Martial delivered Bordeaux from one; St. Marcel delivered Paris; St. Veran, Arles; St. Bie, Vendôme; Sieur de Chin, Mons; Raymond de Sulpy, Neufchâtel; St. Loup, Troyes. St. Hilary and St. Donatus also slew dragons in France. The town Tarascon on the Rhone derives its name from the monster "tarasque," said to have desolated that region. He had been vainly encountered by knights; but soon after the crucifixion, Lazarus, and his sisters, Mary Magdalene and Martha, came into this region, and St. Martha successfully encountered the monster. With a crucifix for her only weapon she met the dragon in a forest and pres-

ently returned with his dead body tied to a ribbon worn at her waist.

Renan told me of an island on the coast of his native Brittany from which some saint had exterminated serpents, after the fashion of Patrick in Ireland, and where the peasantry go to get a little of the soil to use as a vermifuge. But it is rare to find so much faith as that left in any dragon-exterminator. After visiting various regions I have found such traditions faint among the populace, and growing fainter under the republican régime. But at length I got fairly on the trail, as it were, of a dragon. In a book printed nearly thirty years ago I read that a stuffed dragon was suspended over the altar of an old church at Cimies, near Nice, having been subdued by St. Victor, chief saint of the Riviera. I hastened to that region—this was many years ago—and was grievously disappointed. There was nothing of the kind visible, and when I asked about it the priests sharply disowned knowledge of any such thing. An old resident, however, told me that there had been a dragon over the altar, which, some years before, had been taken into Nice. I sought in Nice, and was there informed that the dragon had gone to pieces—crumbled to dust—not an inch of it being left. So my last hope of seeing a bit of dragon faded.

But now I am again in the Riviera, and have just returned from a visit to Cimies. I have seen the dragon! The church was closed, but a Franciscan friar admitted me, and showed me various reliques. When I asked him about the dragon which used to be there, he was genuinely puzzled for a time, but presently exclaimed—"Ah, the crocodile! You mean the crocodile!" Then he conducted me to a closet behind one of the altars, unlocked it, and there, sure enough, suspended from the ceiling was a crocodile. He said that it had long hung in front of the altar, but in the lapse of time bits of it began to fall on the worshipers and it was removed into the dark closet. Of its legend he seemed to know nothing, and I fear could not realize the mystical picturesqueness of the proximity of the mummied crocodile to the mummied St. Victor—the dragon-slayer—which he showed me as the great relique of the church.

In the time of Cæsar, Cimies then called Cemenelum, was the capital of this region, Nice being merely its port. It was destroyed by the Lombards thirteen centuries ago, and now consists chiefly of a church and convent (Franciscan) and the few houses which supply their needs. A monument of its ancient greatness remains in the magnificent ruin of an amphitheatre and a temple of Apollo. The church is a converted shrine of Diana and part of her temple may be in the church—though it is only some 500 years old. The name of Nice was Nike (Victory), given by the Phoceans of Marseilles after their victory over the Ligurians, the original inhabitants of this place. St. Victor's name may have been derived from Nike, i. e., Victoire. This saint is said to have propagated the faith in this region about the year 1200. And it seems that to him was popularly ascribed the death of the desolating dragon, which, though it had killed all the warriors who encountered it, surrendered to the saint's crucifix and expired quietly at his feet. It indicates the potency of faith that a crocodile of moderate dimensions should have been able for many centuries to do duty as a desolating dragon. When this stuffed animal was first set up as a dragon, the crocodile, one would say, must have been unfamiliar on this side of the Mediterranean. But it may be that the myth of Cimies originated in a tradition—possibly not without basis—that the Riviera was once infested with such huge reptiles; their extermination would of course be claimed for the priest and his crucifix. This Cimies crocodile might have been preserved as a specimen of the exterminated brood, and the legend gradually assumed the more common form of a single combat between saint and dragon. The relic was somewhat foreshortened, and some feet above me, and perhaps seemed smaller than it really was. It looked about eight feet long. How could a creature so small, a foeman so little worthy of the saintly steel, have been regarded with awe? I have observed in several ancient sculptures and pictures of combats between heroes and dragons that the monsters are rarely larger than their conquerors. Perhaps this may be explained by the popular belief that the dragon's desolating strength was preternatural, satanic: its terror was invisible. When the primitive science of dragons was lost, this crocodile must have been ridiculed. So it could no longer prove the potency of any saint, and naturally crept to its dusthole. There with cracked skin, jaws expanded only to show their lost teeth, broken claws, the pitiable relic appeared a type of hideous dogmas which once awed the people, from pulpit or altar, but have become mere jests for the populace. The dragon of Cimies, and the saint who subdued him, could they revive for a ghostly midnight interview, might feel a certain sympathy for each other. They are similarly dried up, and equally neglected by the great world. In no Guide Book can I find mention of either. St. Victor's real services, whatever they were, have been harvested by others, and endowed other reputations than his own. His fame depended largely on his dragon. It is said that the peaceful surrender of the dragon to the saint was the miracle which converted the entire region to Christian faith. The regenerate dragon was thus himself a sort of missionary, and, in quietly dying, a martyr; he deserved his place at the altar. When the dragon disappeared,

the saint's glory must have measurably faded. There is now no witness at Cimies to any practical achievement of St. Victor, except this crumbling crocodile hidden away in a closet, and forgotten even by his holy custodian,—who did not dignify him with the title of dragon, but merely called him "crocodile."

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

THE ETHICS OF PARTY.

BY GENERAL M. M. TRUMBULL.

It is related of Thaddeus Stevens, that when he was "leader" of the Republican party in the House of Representatives, he once questioned the chairman of the committee on elections, concerning an election case then pending. The chairman said that it was of no great consequence either way, as both of the contestants were infernal rascals. "Very true," said Mr. Stevens, "but our duty is to take care of our own infernal rascal." This reply was in harmony with the orthodox ethics of party.

The recent riot in the House of Representatives over the case of Smith against Jackson, an election contest from West Virginia, shows that the ethics of Mr. Stevens continues to prevail in Congress. Each party stood loyally by its own. With patriotic indifference to the merits of the case or the rights of the parties, the Republicans were "solid" for Smith, and the Democrats for Jackson. The case was tried before the committee on elections, according to the ethics of party. The Republicans on the committee dutifully believed all the testimony offered by Smith and disbelieved all that was offered by Jackson; while the Democrats, equally faithful, accepted all Jackson's evidence as infallible gospel truth, and all the evidence for Smith they consistently held to be rank perjury.

The Republican majority, having as in duty bound, according to the ethics of party, prepared a report in favor of Smith, the Democratic minority, as in duty bound, following the same rule of action, prepared a report in favor of Jackson. The matter coming into the House for settlement, Bedlam broke loose, and Anarchy ruled for a week. The minority resorted to that useful device of party ethics, known as "filibustering," or the tactics of obstruction, confusion, and delay. The special manœuvre adopted in this case is called "breaking a quorum." Breaking a quorum is so easy that boys can do it. All you have to do is to talk against time, offer motions and resolutions, demand the Ayes and Nays, and when the roll is called remain silent, and refuse to vote. You make as much noise as possible until the clerk begins to call the roll, and then you become suddenly deaf and dumb. As soon as the vote is announced you recover your speech again and shout "No quorum," if the numbers announced are less than a majority of all the members elected.

In the present case the manœuvre was defeated by the Speaker of the House, who decided that the number of members present in the House, and not the number voting, was the test of a quorum. As soon as the Speaker made this decision, the House of Representatives resolved itself into a turbulent, howling mob, the members of each party threatening and reviling the other, while the presiding officer was denounced as a tyrant and usurper. His calls to order were met with defiance and derision. Whatever one man said was cheered by his own party and hissed by the other. The floor of the House was converted into a circus arena and the honorable members played their noisy parts to a delighted gallery.

A couple of months ago, a contest between two notorious prizefighters whose names curiously happen to be Smith and Jackson, took place at the rooms of the Pelican Club, in London. A very fair quality of Pandemonium was presented on that occasion. The cries of "foul," "fair," "fair," "foul," the cheering, hissing, hooting, and howling of the rival partisans actually charged the telegraphic wires with extra electricity, exhibited in blue sparks. The Smith and Jackson contest in the American Congress was a very close and correct imitation of the Smith and Jackson contest at the Pelican Club in London.

It is strange that the American Congress, although in existence more than a hundred years, has not yet found out the numbers necessary to constitute a quorum to do business. The Speaker holds that if a majority of all the members elected, is present in the House, there is a quorum within the meaning of the constitution: the "filibusters" maintain that a majority of all the members elected present and *voting*, is necessary to constitute a quorum, and that the only evidence of a member's presence is his vote. They were very indignant that the Speaker should impeach their veracity by counting them as present when they were actually telling him to his face that they were absent. No matter how vehemently they told him they were not there, he counted them as present.

From whatever party ground the question is examined, a decision by the House on party lines weakens confidence in the honesty of our statesmen. Surely there can be no question of higher privilege than the right of a member of Congress to his seat: yet this important issue between Mr. Smith and Mr. Jackson is decided, not on its merits, but on party grounds alone. Had the House of Representatives been a tribunal to decide a question between Mr. Smith and Mr. Jackson, as to the ownership of a horse, the members would have given their decision according to the very right of it as revealed by the evidence. In deciding

election cases, the House of Representatives is a judicial tribunal and every member ought to vote impartially as a judge. Controlled by the ethics of party, reason and conscience abdicate their offices for political advantage.

THE THREE PHASES OF REFLEX-MOTIONS.

THE entire field of the activity of psychic life, which under normal circumstances can be connected with, or, as it were, illuminated by, consciousness, shows three different phases or stages, which like the steps of a ladder rise one above the other.

The first and lowest stage is that of simple reflex-motions, which are executed without necessarily entering into consciousness. Such reflex-motions are many kinds of muscular movements, the unconscious facial expression of emotions, winking, sneezing, coughing, sucking, chewing, swallowing, and vomiting. These reflex-motions may, or may not, be accompanied with consciousness. If we do not direct our attention to them, they, or at least some of them, may take place unconsciously upon the occurrence of the irritation by which they are provoked, and against which they must be considered as reactions. Most of these reflex-motions, also, we can bring about at will. In that case the mere thought of them may serve as an irritation to provoke the reflex-motion. The mere idea of the act becomes, as it were, an inner irritant that produces the reflex-motion.

The simple reflex-motions constitute what we commonly call 'reflex-motions in the strictest sense of the word.' Agreeably to their nature, they stand, as a rule, below the threshold of consciousness. Without thinking of it, without being constantly aware or conscious of it, our heart beats, we breathe and wink, and execute most complicated movements. In the adjoined diagram we represent a simple reflex-motion, thus :

DIAGRAM OF SIMPLE REFLEX-MOTION.



The centres of the simple reflex-motions, physiology teaches, are situated in the bulb (*medulla oblongata*).

We shall now speak of the second phase.

Everybody, perhaps, is from his own experience acquainted with some phenomenon in human soul-life that might be designated as 'a direct and simple reflex-motion of conscious will.' This occurs in those unusual or extraordinary situations in which prompt action is demanded, no time being left for deliberation; for example, in the emergency of a sudden danger. We assume, for instance, a father comes home from work and finds the tenement-house in which he lives, on fire. From a window he hears his child crying for help. Without stopping to think whether he can, or whether he cannot, save the life of his boy, whether the staircase might be wrapped in flames, or whether he can reach the place whence the cry proceeds, he rushes into the house at the risk of his own life.

This is a reflex-action that passes through consciousness, but the impulse to action is so overwhelmingly strong that it gives no time or opportunity for any deliberation.

Irritations coming from sensory impressions, if connected with consciousness, in so far as they give information through some of the senses, are called *sensations*. An innervation of motory nerves or the initiative process of motions by muscular contraction, if connected with consciousness, is called *will*. That which causes a motor innervation accompanied with consciousness (an act of will), is called *motive*. A motive may be a sensation, it may be also the memory of, or a thought abstracted from, former sensations. The word "motive" conveys the proper idea of being that which sets in motion. The process of reflex-motion, if connected with consciousness, is called reflex-action, or simply *action*.

An act that is a simple reflex-motion of conscious will may be a direct action without deliberation, because of the strength and urgency of the motive which allows no time for reflection ; such is the case above described. But it may arise from a lack of intelligence also. Observers of animals know many instances where even higher-organized beings, such as apes and dogs, can speedily be provoked to actions, if only the proper motives are applied.

Æsop tells in one of his fables of a monkey-show in which a spectator spoiled the performance by throwing nuts among the actors. The sight of the nuts so strongly engaged the monkeys' attention as to exclude for the moment all other motives; they forgot their training and even their master's whip, and fell into a scramble over the nuts. Similarly Reynard the Fox, in the animal fable, entices Bruin the Bear with a prospect of honey, and Puss the Cat with the suggestion of mousing, to inconsiderate actions.

DIAGRAM OF SIMPLE REFLEX ACTION, BEING A REFLEX-MOTION, CONNECTED WITH CONSCIOUSNESS.



SI.—Sensory impression.
ISN.—Irritation of the sensory nerve.
S.—Sensation.
W.—Will.
IMN.—Innervation of the motor nerve.
MM.—Muscular motion.

In the life of human society simple reflex-actions are rare, though they may frequently be observed

among children, savages, idiots, and the so-called quick-tempered people. In the mind of an educated man every psychical irritation that acts as a motive upon the will, before passing into act, has to run through a shorter or longer process of deliberation.

The memories of former sensations are, as it were, stored up in the mind; they make up the stock of that which goes by the name of *experience*. In so far as they are arranged in a systematic order, they are called *intelligence*. The richer the storehouse of memories is, and the better they are arranged, or associated, the quicker will the old experiences be at hand to interfere with, and perhaps to modify, reflex-actions. The higher the intelligence of a creature is, the less prone will it be to simple reflex-actions, and the stronger will be the power of inhibition, so as to make a process of deliberation possible, before the motive passes into act. A reflex-action of this kind may be called an "act of deliberation."

DIAGRAM SHOWING AN ACT OF DELIBERATION.



SI.—Sensory impression.

ISN.—Irritation of sensory nerve.

S.—Sensation.

P.—Perception starting a chain of deliberation by passing through the memories *M 1*, *M 2*, *M 3*, and ending in

PE.—The plan of execution.

W.—Will.

IMN.—Innervation of the motor nerve.

MM.—Muscular motion.

These three phases of reflex-motions represent three stages of a more and more complicated activity of the soul. The first considered by itself has its place below the threshold of consciousness, although it may be brought within its sphere: it may become conscious. The second reaches to and stands upon the threshold of consciousness; the third fills out the whole sphere of consciousness and appears in orderly connection with all the memories of experience.

* * *

Nature in all things proceeds with great economy. This is particularly manifest in the function of consciousness.

We may compare consciousness to a light, which illuminates certain activities of the human soul, but leaves others to be performed in the gloom of unconsciousness. Consciousness itself has not the power to accomplish a single one of all the activities which it illuminates. It only accompanies them and sheds light upon them, bearing now upon the one and now upon the other object of attention, as they severally appear at the focal point of our central soul-life. If but the innervation of the respective fibres be accomplished, the motions of our bodies and even the thoughts of our brains will take place just as well without consciousness as with consciousness; not otherwise than a machine, that is set a-going, will work in darkness as well as in light.

If all the activities that are performed within our body, or at least all those that take place in the highest and most unstable living substance—the nerves and the brain—were without exception connected with consciousness, what a prodigious chaos would our soul in that case exhibit! In the general turmoil we should not find a moment for deliberation. In the midst of so much excitement and work, no leisure would be afforded for the selection of that which at the time is most important and most needed. The new and extraordinary could not be discriminated from the mass of ordinary events that follow the settled course of routine. The restriction of consciousness to a narrow field is, therefore, a most excellent arrangement. And this arrangement has not the slightest disadvantage, because the limitation is not at all stable; on the contrary, consciousness can be quickly shifted about. It can at a moment's notice be attached to any kind of psychic activity, as occasion may demand.

When a child is learning to play on the piano, how laboriously must he learn to distinguish every note and every key, and to associate the notes with the keys that belong to them! His consciousness must again and again be concentrated upon the task with the most intense attention, and in spite of all his attention, how awkwardly do his hands blunder over the key-board! Compare his play to that of an accomplished player. How swiftly and with what unconscious ease the virtuoso's fingers glide across the piano! The same difference of conscious awkwardness and unconscious adroitness is noticeable in all arts and in all sciences. What enormous exertions of conscious thought the schoolboy makes in his calculations, while the mathematician operates with his formulas with unconscious certainty, like a machinist whose hand even in the dark is able to find and to use every screw and every lever of his engine.

When the mental activity of our present consciousness sinks down into unconsciousness, all the attention of the mind that is available can be directed upon new difficulties, and thus our thoughts gain sufficient freedom for better and higher, or more needed, work. When mental processes in the sphere of intelligence have become automatic, we call them acts of unconscious intelligence.

Unconscious intelligence works more rapidly than conscious intelligence, because its mechanism is simpler than where the same mental acts are accompanied with consciousness. And unconscious intelligence often works with more exactness than conscious intelligence, because, machine-like, it works with mechanical accu-

racy. In former times, so long as thinking was identified with consciousness, unconscious thought was the greatest stumbling-block of psychology. Since psychologists have learned to distinguish between the activity of intelligence and that of consciousness, they find no difficulty in the fact that unconscious thought is possible.

Lest the ideas 'unconscious thought' and 'unconscious' feeling be misunderstood, a few words may be added on the meaning of the word "consciousness." Consciousness is that intensified and concentrated feeling which constitutes the character of the central soul. Its condition is a coördination of all the feelings into a system grouping them, as it were, all together within the circumference of a circle, in the centre of which is located the present object of attention. There are many feelings that are too far from the centre to be singly discriminated; they form one indistinct mass of feeling concerning the general state of the whole organism. The German physiologists most appropriately call this indistinct mass of innumerable feelings "*Gemein-gefühl*"; the English language, wanting a good Saxon expression, had to resort to the Greek word *cœnæsthesis*. We shall as an equivalent term introduce the expression "general feeling" which appears to be more congenial to the spirit of the English language and less heavy than the foreign-sounding "*cœnæsthesis*." *

Unconscious thought and unconscious feeling are by no means altogether bare of feeling; yet they are called unconscious, because, and in so far as these thoughts and feelings are not discriminated in their individuality, they disappear among the whole mass of the general feeling and cannot therefore be remembered in their individuality. The concentrated feeling of the central soul naturally can recall only those thoughts and feelings in their clearness and distinctness which appeared with clearness and distinctness, or in other words those which appeared in the centre of its system of coördination. P. C.

CORRESPONDENCE.

"MISCEGENATION" NOT A DANGER IN THE SOUTH.

To the Editor of THE OPEN COURT:—

I HAVE read and enjoyed "Two Perils of the Indo-European." I do not think "race mixture" probable. It is not inevitable, nor will it solve the "race question." It is no peril, nor does it threaten. I have not examined the statistics and therefore only write from observation. I am warranted, I believe, in saying fewer mulattoes, offsprings of white and black, are born to-day than ever within the last sixty years. The number of such births is decreasing. A white man with a negro-family is a rare thing to see in these days. It is seldom one meets a negress with a mulatto child, the offspring of a white paramour. When I say seldom, I mean all the word conveys, and do not confine the word as relative to the past. I was nearing my teens when the war closed. I have had many companions, but I remember but one instance of any of them being the father of a child by a black mother, and not one of them but this one, with a mistress who had negro blood in her veins. I can distinctly remember how indignant the denial was when a charge of such a connection was made.

Let Prof. Cope appreciate some additional facts—potent factors. Examine the question of the number of negresses married and investigate the number of births, legitimate and illegitimate, and the number of deaths—including abortion and the still-born. I include among legitimate children the offspring of blacks living as man and wife without legal marriage because it is not at all uncommon. I doubt if he would find in proportion to population as many illegitimate births among blacks as among whites Why? Not because the whites are less pure. During slavery children meant money to the owner of the mother. A child means expense now. The slave-owner, if actuated by no other motive than gain, took care of, and gave the best of medical attention to the offspring of his slave. There is less probability of the blacks being absorbed now than ever. Miscegenation is prohibited in some of the states by law. It is prohibited in all of them by a public opinion which is stronger than law. A white man to-day who would live with a negress and have children by her is disgraced and dishonored, ostracized from decent society, and relegated to such associations as bars him out from any decent position in the community.

I have written briefly as I could what has come under my observation. I could say much more, but my purpose has not been to find fault, but to call Prof. Cope's attention to conditions and facts which have never been investigated and never counted as factors in the discussions of the race problem.

Yours truly,

NEW ORLEANS, La. E. E. MOISE.

* The proper English translation for "cœnæsthesis," (κοινός, common, and αἴσθησις, feeling,) the German "Gemein-gefühl," would perhaps have been "common sense," or common feeling. The word "common," however, has acquired a specified meaning through the Scotch school of so-called "common-sense philosophers."

BOOK REVIEWS.

DIE GESETZE DER FREIHEIT. Von *Dr. Franz Staudinger*. I. Band, Das Sittengesetz. Darmstadt: Verlag von L. Brill.

In a former number of THE OPEN COURT we had occasion to note a pamphlet by Mr. Staudinger, which embodied the general purpose of the present work. Three volumes were there announced; only the first, the volume before us, has appeared (1887). It is entitled *Die Gesetze der Freiheit* (The Laws of Freedom), *Untersuchungen über die wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen der Sittlichkeit, der Erkenntniss, und der Gesellschaftsordnung* (Investigations upon the scientific foundations of morality, cognition, and social order). The system of Dr. Staudinger may be designated as rational socialism. He is a pronounced opponent of all indeliberate and revolutionary methods. He is the pronounced opponent, too, of all half-hearted attempts at alleviation. He believes that all reform must start from the basis of existing conditions; yet contends that development must lead beyond them. For the exposition of the civil polity of the social organization sought to be established, we must refer the reader to his pamphlet *Sonst, Heut, und Einst*, and to the forthcoming volumes of the work itself. The salient feature to be remarked in this, Mr. Staudinger's, performance—and a feature so strangely in contrast to the fantastic speculations and imaginative reveries of current nationalistic movements—is its logical, comprehensive, and philosophical disposition. Where others dream, Dr. Staudinger reasons.

We shall examine, here, but the scope and methods of the first volume.

Dr. Staudinger begins with the proposition of a distinction

between theoretical and practical freedom ; or, with the question of determinism and indeterminism. In theory, our actions and conduct are determined ; reason and fact point to it ; the objection of the consequent destruction of moral responsibility does not apply, for the objection assumes the point in issue. In practice, however, the contrary appears true ; an inner voice cries, at crit ical moments, and intuitively, "I am free." Therewith, the first problem arises. The immediate consciousness that tells us we are free and the mediate ratiocinative process that tells us we are not free, are in contradiction. To the solution of this difficulty must be undertaken (1) an examination of the material content of our ethical consciousness, and (2) an investigation of the nature of the law of causality, and of the character and the extent of cognition : to which task the first two books are devoted.

In intimate connection with the latter question comes the problem—the chief problem of the work—of ascertaining the actual motives and factors whereby, consciously, we are inwardly impelled to a certain line of volition ; in other words, the determination of the conditions of morality, and the establishment of the moral law. An act, or phenomenon, viewed from the observative, rational standpoint, evokes the simple investigation of its truth, its existence, the interconnection of its parts. Viewed from the moral standpoint, an act, a human act, calls forth an entirely different species of judgment ; we approve or disapprove of the act ; not its existence, not its truth are drawn in question, but its admissibility is the issue before the mind. This is denominated the moral judgment, and with the moral judgment we come to the third question of the book, namely, Why do we pass a character of judgment upon acts that does not predicate their existence or truth, but merely expresses the approbation or disapprobation referred to ? and, What is the standard by which we may determine whether an act is really good or bad, moral or unmoral ?

Again, to reach this fundamental moral law, what is the method to be employed ? Not the critical collation of the moral sense of the cultured. Nor the comparative method of ethnology. Nor the evolutionary *modus explicandi*. But the method of the so-called exact sciences. Some peculiar characteristic property is hit upon, and freed from all superfluous appurtenance ; only those conditions of manifestation are retained without which the 'property' in question would not appear ; wherever these conditions are present, the 'property' is present. This peculiar property, or characteristic, Dr. Staudinger says, is the moral judgment. We are to inquire, accordingly, what and how we think when we think ethically ; we are to inquire what ethical is, and not what is ethical. We investigate, we ascertain, what conditions an act may be stripped of without causing the disappearance of the moral judgment and what the conditions are that remain and without which the moral judgment is not present ; and having found these, we proceed analytically further, till we strike the elements of mind from which the moral judgment results as a logical necessity.

The foundation of the moral judgment lies not in our acts themselves, but in their consequences and motive intentions ; accompanying which latter there must further be the consciousness of obligation, of an 'ougbt', which 'ought', to be ethical, must be attended by individual volition. Necessarily, having found an 'ought', we seek the law from which it is derived. That law cannot be external to us ; it cannot be the greatest happiness of the greatest number, nor the norm of utilitarianism, nor any of that character ; it must be recognized as a subjective inherent potency ; it must be one that comprises all that I am bound to do and that consequently I simultaneously will to be done. In the search for this law the author recognizes in Kant the one that has best emphasized the principle from which he starts—namely the origin *in reason* of the obligatory moral law. Which is formulated as follows : *Regulate thy will to conform to the accepted principle of an organic order of human society, and strive, so far as in thee lies, to form and fashion that order.* It is this phase, the social phase, that must be added to Kant's rule ('so act that the maxim of thy conduct may be fit for universal law'), in order that the latter fully comprehend the conditions under which the will of one individual may be brought into true accord with that of every other ; the ideal and logical outcome of the universal law of freedom.

The successive steps by which Mr. Staudinger develops his system, the valuable collateral argumentation employed, and the criticisms of defunct and currently entertained doctrines, we have not the space to enter upon. A word may be said, however, relative to his solution of the difficulties involved in the question of practical freedom, before referred to. To him, the conditions of morality are the conditions of freedom. They indicate the province wherein we may do what we will, provided we will what is included within the ethical law. Within that province reason is mistress. And practical freedom is nothing more, nothing else, than the consciousness of the unrestricted dominance of reason in the province that is her own. μκρκ.

Psychology as a Natural Science, Applied to the Solution of Occult Psychic Phenomena. By C. G. Raue, M. D. Philadelphia : Porter & Coates.

The object of this work is defined to be, the application of psychology as a natural science to the solution of occult psychic phenomena. Dr. Raue accepts as the groundwork of his investigations the researches of Friedrich Eduard Beneke, as the outcome of whose labors, he maintains, psychology as a natural science must be regarded. Beneke's activity extends over the period from 1820 to 1853 ; his instrument of psychological research is self-observation or introspection, and that alone ; he rejects the aid of physiological psychology ; he is opposed, from the outset, to any scheme that would explain mental phenomena from physical causes, and may be characterized as occupying the standpoint of spiritualism in the philosophical sense of the word. Dr. Raue, in insisting upon this standpoint says : "The psychologist will always thankfully receive the diligent researches of "physiology, as they undoubtedly tend to clear up the complex "*conditions* under which mental phenomena manifest themselves, "but he must earnestly protest against the hasty assertions which "make conditions causes and pretend to possess in physiology the "only and sufficient means for the explanation of mental life. Even "the simplest mental phenomenon in its origin and nature cannot be "satisfactorily explained by physiology. How utterly inadequate "this science proves for the explanation of higher mental processes !" The bulk of Dr Raue's work is devoted to an exposition of the principles of psychology viewed from the anti-physiological standpoint. The pronounced purpose of his examination of modern psycho-physiological research is to reject the results that that branch of science has attained and not to find in it an auxilliary, however feeble, to the elucidation of the nature of soul and mind, or even to recognize it as a legitimate engine for the discovery of psychological truth ; Dr. Raue has a thesis to establish, and the conclusion to which he seeks to arrive is the criterion employed in the establishment of that conclusion. How different and more satisfying the treatment could have been made, had the author not contemned the investigations of physiological experimental research ! Those investigations have thrown a flood of light, for instance, upon the nature of attention—as may be learned from M. Ribot's critical and masterly monograph ; but Dr. Raue without their aid, "finds no difficulty in giving" in two pages "a full analytical account of the *mental process usually designated attention*." Similarly, with the treatment of the topics "consciousness," "concepts," "intellect," etc., we need the corrective knowledge attainable from Galton's works, from Binet's "Psychologie du Raisonnement," and Max Müller's "Science of Thought." The

conclusions of modern French psychology are utterly disregarded. Of the theory of consciousness which those conclusions bid fair to establish, not a word. In fact, in the very department that forms the purpose and culmination of the work,—the explication, namely, of the so-called occult phenomena,—in which France acknowledgedly stands pre-eminent, the researches of Charcot, of Luys, of Bernheim, and a score of others are given no place—or at best are merely referred to under the comprehensive and impersonal designation of "theories."

Finally, after five hundred or more pages of foundation, we meet with theses like the following: "The soul is a system of diverse psychic forces, united into one whole organism. These forces are spaceless; they have no corporeal extension, and therefore are not encumbered by space. Their action is spaceless and conditioned only by psychic relations." "The soul is an organism of *psychic* and *not* of material forces, and as such lies absolutely out of the range of mechanical and chemical analysis, and consequently also beyond the grasp of the physical laws of dissolution." Surely, the pursuit of psychology is not demanded to affirm such a theory! We at least—and Dr. Raue has anticipated our opposition by attaching uncomplimentary epithets to the presumption of those who would affect wisdom through the appellation "we"—must unceremoniously reject it. But we admire the candor and conviction of Dr. Raue, however much we may disagree with the position maintained. The following, the concluding paragraph of the work, will explain his position. "In the "elucidation of this subject it was my part to state, and to state "fairly, that on the one side there exist *possibilities* by which an "appearance of communication between man and spirit may be "produced, and yet be only the effect of natural psychical action "of mind upon mind; that imitation may and does succeed in "taking the appearance of spirit interaction, and yet be only the "result of cleverly construed physical contrivances. On the "other side, I had to show that the assumption of a like possi-"bility of an intercourse between man and departed spirits is not "only warranted but necessitated by the existing psychical facts, "because this assumption is in accord with the nature of the soul "of man, and the laws by which the psychic organism is governed "throughout its existence in this wonderful world of psychic and "material forces combined." μκρκ.

Geschichte der Ethik in der Neueren Philosophie. By *Friederich Jodl*. First Volume. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta.

The first volume of Dr. Jodl's *History of Ethics in Modern Philosophy* appeared in 1882, while the author held a Privatdocentship at the University of Munich; the second, which we shall review in a later number of this periodical, appeared last summer. During the interval Dr. Jodl received a call to Prague, where he now holds the chair of philosophy.

The work of Dr. Jodl is occupied with the historical investigation, in modern philosophy, of the development of the two problems, What is ethical? and Whence does the ethical originate?—or, paraphrasing the latter,—In what fundamental circumstances of the world-order and the constitution of man does Morality take its rise? The author's researches are confined, necessarily, to the theoretical phrases of the evolution of the science of ethics; they being, at the present day, the most important. His method is systematical as well as historical; not only is the historical interdependence of ethical systems shown, but their tenets and results are systematized.

The two first chapters are an historical résumé of the ethical philosophy of antiquity and early Christianity. Dr. Jodl then passes to the danger that first threatened the dominance of Christian dogmatism, namely, the Humanistic movement and the Protestant reformation. He shows how the former ended in cultured indifference, and the latter in the adoption of the same policy as that employed by Catholicism. All Christian confessions clung, in the last resort, to the dogma that without faith and belief in their peculiar tenets moral reward was hopeless. Ethical culture aside from the church, was declared impossible. The liberation of ethical research from dogmatic fetters, the recognition of ethical science as a department of human opinion independent of theological principles and governed by its own peculiar laws, had yet to be established. And we find that the work was done in that momentous century of secular and religious struggles which constitutes the basis of modern political and intellectual freedom. At the termination of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth, in France, the Netherlands, and England, this tendency, it is seen, clearly appears. The productions of the epoch were not, indeed, systematic. They did not seek the origin of the ethical. Their significance was negative. But the important point is this, that ethics now demanded philosophical legitimation.

With Charron and Bacon the movement began. Grotius and Hobbes followed. The activity of Hobbes Dr. Jodl rates as of the greatest moment; his logic, insight, and critical acumen are finely emphasized, and the close connection of his theories with the doctrines of the Cambridge school and his later opponents of the sixteenth century clearly pointed out. Then comes the examination of the ethical philosophy of Locke with the characterization of the impulse it gave to modern ethical thought. Clarke and Intellectualism, Schaftesbury and Naturalism, Mandeville, Butler, Hartley, Warburton, and Paley follow. The Scottish school, whereof Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith form the nucleus, is next discussed. Then we pass to France, to Descartes and Malebranche, Bayle and Helvetius, Voltaire and Rousseau, the Encyclopedists, and Baron Holbach. And, finally, Spinoza and Leibniz (these two with especial care and comprehensiveness) are critically set forth. The genetic relation of each system with that which precedes and that which follows is uniformly insisted upon, and its influence traced throughout the various ramifications of the history of modern philosophy.

With the systematization of the ideas of Leibnitz by Wolff, the volume closes. In his researches, Dr. Jodl is conscientious and exhaustive. His information is derived at first hand. And his appreciation of the currents of English thought, especially, is exceptional. All in all, Dr. Jodl's work may be marked as the most important and most reliable historical examination of ethical philosophy hitherto published. μκρκ.

NOTES.

We cannot agree with Mr. W. R. Thayer when he says: "There is no logical middle ground between faith and agnosticism." If he understands by faith irrationalism and by agnosticism rationalism, he is right. But do we not meet as often with rational faith as with an irrational lack of faith? Cardinal Newman and his friends found no other way. Representing the intellectual life of their church, they saw the inconsistencies of the creed they confessed and imagined that there was no other choice than that between Rome and irreligion. If they had seen a way on which they could have advanced, we do not doubt that they would have done so. The Open Court is devoted to the work of pointing out that a religion is possible on the basis of scientific truth; and this religion is the only true religion toward which all creeds, all denominations naturally tend. It is the humanitarian religion, the coming of which is hoped for everywhere, and to the tenets of which the most radical freethinker can subscribe.
